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ABSTRACT
In this article, I follow up on a suggestion made by Josephine Dono-
van that a Hume-inspired ethic of sympathy would be a better foun-
dation for an animal ethic than more rationalistic approaches of both 
utilitarianism and deontology. I then expand on Donovan’s sugges-
tion by further suggesting that Hume’s “sentiment of humanity” 
could easily be expanded to include other animals. Hume’s ethic of 
sympathy, I argue, answers the need for an ethic that is at once both 
personal, contextual, and sufficiently universalizable to incorporate 
the political need for something like justice. I say, “something like 
justice,” because animals are explicitly ruled out of justice relation-
ships by Hume due to his more narrow definition of that term. What I 
mean by “something like justice” is a more impersonal and objective 
element (Hume’s “general point of view”) that transcends exclusively 
personal or private interests. 
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Introduction
Two recent collections of feminist care ethics as it applies 
to animal ethics, Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring 
Ethic for the Treatment of Animals (1996) and The Feminist 
Care Tradition in Animal Ethics (2007), seek a new theoretical 
foundation for animal ethics beyond the traditional utilitarian 
or deontological bases provided by Singer and Regan respec-
tively. Both anthologies include articles critical of Singer’s 
and Regan’s dismissal of emotion in favor of “pure” reason. 
In this article, I follow up on Josephine Donovan’s provocative 
suggestion that a Hume-inspired ethic of sympathy would be 
a better foundation for an animal ethic than more rationalis-
tic approaches of both utilitarianism and deontology (1994). 
I expand on Donovan’s suggestion by further suggesting that 
Hume’s “sentiment of humanity” could easily be expanded to 
include at least other animals and perhaps even the larger eco-
system itself (although I will have to leave that task to another 
time). Hume’s ethic of sympathy, I argue, answers the need, 
acknowledged by several of the contributors to the anthologies 
mentioned above, for an ethic that is at once both personal, 
contextual, and sufficiently universalizable to incorporate the 
political need for something like justice. I say, “something like 
justice,” because animals, as we will see, are explicitly ruled 
out of justice relationships by Hume due to his more narrow 
definition of that term. What I mean here by “something like 
justice” is a more impersonal and objective element that tran-
scends exclusively personal or private interests. 
Role of the Sentiments
While Hume privileges the role of the emotions or senti-
ments in our moral judgments, Singer and Regan go out of 
their way to distance themselves from emotion. Peter Singer, 
comparing the cases of animal experimentation with the types 
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of medical experiments the Nazi doctors performed on human 
beings writes (in the Preface to the original 1975 edition of 
Animal Liberation) that, “The ultimate justification for opposi-
tion to both of these kinds of experiments, though, is not emo-
tional. It is an appeal to basic moral principles which we all 
accept, and the application of these principles to the victims 
of both kinds of experiment is demanded by reason, not emo-
tion” (2009, P.S., 11). Singer prides himself that, “Nowhere 
in [Animal Liberation]…do I appeal to the reader’s emotions 
where they cannot be supported by reason” (2009, P.S., 10). His 
reasoning being apparently that, “The portrayal of those who 
protest against cruelty to animals as sentimental, emotional 
‘animal lovers’ has had the effect of excluding the entire issue 
of our treatment of nonhumans from serious political and moral 
discussion.” Compare this with Regan: “Since all who work on 
behalf of the interests of animals are more than a little familiar 
with the tired charges of being ‘irrational,’ ‘sentimental,’ ‘emo-
tional,’ or worse, we can give the lie to these accusations only 
by making a concentrated effort not to indulge our emotions or 
parade our sentiments. And that requires making a sustained 
commitment to rational inquiry” (2004, lii). Or later and even 
more forcefully: “reason—not sentiment, not emotion—reason 
compels us to recognize the equal inherent value of…animals 
and…their equal right to be treated with respect” (quoted in 
Donovan 1990, 59). But as Donovan notes: “Regan’s and Sing-
er’s rejection of emotion and their concern about being branded 
sentimentalist are not accidental, rather, they expose the inher-
ent bias in contemporary animal rights theory towards rational-
ism, which, paradoxically, in the form of Cartesian objectivism, 
established a major theoretical justification for animal abuse” 
(1990, 59). Or as Brian Luke points out, “Both [Singer and Re-
gan] insist that they are relying on reason alone, and not emo-
tion, to establish their animal liberationist conclusions. But the 
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crucial step in their arguments, that humans and other animals 
are relevantly similar, cannot be established by reason alone” 
(1992, 127). For that, sympathy is required, as Luke goes on to 
demonstrate. Although he does not reference Hume explicitly, 
this is a very Humean move.
Hume’s assertion that: “Reason is, and ought only to be the 
slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office 
than to serve and obey them” (1978, 414-415) is well known. 
For Hume, reason alone is insufficient to generate our moral 
judgments of approbation or disapprobation. In his An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume writes:
But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, 
be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful 
tendency of qualities and actions; it is not alone suffi-
cient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Util-
ity is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the 
end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same 
indifference towards the means. It is requisite a senti-
ment should here display itself, in order to give a pref-
erence to the useful above the pernicious tendencies. 
This sentiment can be no other than a feeling for 
the happiness of mankind [sic], and a resentment of 
their misery; since these are the different ends which 
virtue and vice have a tendency to promote (1975, 286 
bold mine).
Borrowing from Hume and expanding the scope, I would 
like to propose a new basis for a liberatory animal ethics based 
on a similar, slightly modified moral sentiment: 
A feeling for the happiness of all sentient beings, 
and a resentment of their misery. 
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Although Hume himself never made this move from “hu-
manity” to “all sentient beings” (he wrote the words I quote 
above a good two centuries prior to Peter Singer’s Animal Lib-
eration after all), I see no reason, other than his situatedness in 
time and place, why he could not allow it. As Mary Midgley 
argues:
Morality…was for [Hume] not primarily an affair of 
reasoning at all, but of the feelings, especially the ‘sen-
timent of humanity’, which is a natural not an artificial 
virtue. ‘Humanity’ is here a wide and rather mysteri-
ous term covering a great range of sympathetic feel-
ing. Most of the examples Hume gives of it deal with 
feeling for fellow-humans. And in principle it would 
be possible for an absolute dismisser to rule that, if it 
is a feeling of humanity, it cannot have a non-human 
object. But Hume sees no reason to make this arbitrary 
move. He treats the question of what beings we can 
sympathize with and feel indignant about as a genu-
inely empirical one, to be settled by experience (1983, 
48).
Sympathy
To be able to sympathize with a being, human or nonhuman, 
would imply for Hume a certain resemblance to ourselves. 
Hume clearly assumes that we sympathize with other humans; 
indeed this is the basis for our moral sentiments. As Hume ex-
plains sympathy in the Treatise:
The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and 
operations, nor can any one be actuated by any affec-
tion, of which the others are not, in some degree, sus-
ceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of 
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one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections 
readily pass from one person to another, and beget cor-
respondent movements in every human creature (1978, 
576).
Thus sympathy works by a sort of emotional contagion. 
While it is true that Hume allows that, “Every human crea-
ture resembles ourselves, and by that means has an advantage 
above any other object, in operating on the imagination” (1978, 
359), this need not rule out the possibility of a somewhat lesser 
sympathy for nonhumans. In fact, Hume himself invites us to 
“take a general survey of the universe, and observe the force of 
sympathy thro’ the whole animal creation, and the easy com-
munication of sentiments from one thinking being to another” 
(1978, 363). So animals too share a sympathetic nature, and 
are, as we will see, also (pace Descartes) thinking beings, and 
as such can and do communicate their sentiments to us. For 
Hume, they need not be equally rational to be legitimate objects 
for our sympathy. He is clear that humans are superior in terms 
of rationality (1978, 610), but he also warns of setting the bar 
so high that we inadvertently exclude children or other humans 
from our definitions as well (1978, 177), a point often made by 
Singer and Reagan as well.
Hume is explicit about sympathy in animals. He writes: 
“‘Tis evident, that sympathy, or the communication of passions, 
takes place among animals, no less than among men” (1978, 
398). Hume then gives some examples:
The howlings and lamentations of a dog produce a 
sensible concern in his fellows. And ‘tis remarkable, 
that tho’ almost all animals use in play the same mem-
ber, and nearly the same action as in fighting; a lion, a 
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tyger, a cat their paws; an ox his horns; a dog his teeth; 
a horse his heels: Yet they most carefully avoid harm-
ing their companion, even though they have nothing 
to fear from his resentment; which is evident proof of 
the sense brutes have of each other’s pain and pleasure 
(1978, 398).
Of course, it could be suggested that all this proves is that 
humans can and do sympathize with humans while animals can 
and do sympathize with their own kind. In other words, Hume 
has shown that sympathy works on an intra-species basis. The 
crucial question is: can it work on an inter-species basis? This 
is what Midgley’s “absolute dismisser”, as one who dismisses 
out of hand any claims made on behalf of animals’ moral con-
siderability, denies. 
If sympathy works on a principle of sufficient resemblance 
to self, then the question becomes: do animals sufficiently re-
semble us to be able to elicit our sympathy? Are sentiments re-
ally communicable across species barriers? While Hume, to his 
credit, does not simply erase the species barriers—he avoids re-
solving difference into sameness—he does give us good reason 
to think there is sufficient resemblance to generate sympathetic 
feeling towards animals.
Resemblance
Animals share with us characteristics like: reason (1978, 
176-179), beliefs (1978, 178), sympathy (1978, 398); as well 
as direct passions like fear, anger, courage, and grief (1978, 
398); and indirect passions like pride and humility (1978, 324-
328), and love and hatred (1978, 397-398). Again, the claim is 
not that these operate in exactly the same way or to the same 
extent in animals as in humans, but rather that there are corre-
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lates. For example, while Hume, unlike most of his philosophic 
predecessors, finds it self-evident that animals have reason: “no 
truth appears to me evident, than that beasts are endow’d with 
thought and reason as well as men” (1978, 176), he also main-
tains the difference, “Men are superior to beasts principally by 
the superiority of their reason; and they are the degrees of the 
same faculty, which set such an infinite difference betwixt one 
man and another” (1978, 610). What this comment concerning 
the superiority of human reason makes plain, especially by in-
cluding this mention of the (intraspecific) differences amongst 
humans in terms of reason, however, is that the difference be-
tween animal reason and human reason is a difference of degree 
rather than of kind. As Tom Beauchamp summarizes Hume’s 
position in the “Of the Reason of Animals” section of the Trea-
tise, “In general, the human species is superior and possibly 
vastly superior in what we ordinarily think of as intelligence, 
but in degrees only, not in kind — and in some members only, 
not in all members” (1999, 327).
That Hume should attribute indirect passions to animals is 
highly significant. Indirect passions like pride and humility, for 
Hume, require a degree of self-consciousness: 
‘Tis evident, that pride and humility, tho’ directly con-
trary, have yet the same object. This object is self, or 
that succession of related ideas and impressions, of 
which we have an intimate memory and conscious-
ness” (1978, 277). 
If this is the case for humans, it is also the case for animals: 
“The causes of these passions are likewise much the same in 
beasts as in us, making a just allowance for our superior knowl-
edge and understanding” (1978, 326). As Hume consistently 
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maintains, “Thus all the internal principles, that are necessary 
in us to produce either pride or humility, are common to all 
creatures; and since the causes, which excite these passions, are 
likewise the same, we may justly conclude, that these causes 
operate after the same manner thro’ the whole animal creation” 
(1978, 328). Even the important role of secondary approval and 
affirmation that plays a part in human pride (1978, 316) seems 
to be shared by animals as well: 
Add to this, that every species of creatures, which ap-
proach so often to man, as to familiarize themselves 
with him, show an evident pride in his approbation, and 
are pleas’d with his praises and caresses, independent 
of every other consideration. Nor are they the caresses 
of every one without distinction, which give them this 
vanity, but those principally of the persons they know 
and love; in the same manner as that passion is excited 
in mankind (1978, 326). 
Like us, animals seem to care about what others, especially 
those who know them best, think of them. 
It seems then that Hume has given us ample reason to be-
lieve that animals are sufficiently like us in relevant ways. In-
deed, it seems that he has already laid the groundwork that both 
Singer and Regan will build upon, albeit in different directions, 
centuries later. It is too bad that they both ceded Hume’s ground 
of sympathy from the start.
Humean animals, then, are thinking and feeling beings who 
are sensitive to pleasures and pains who thus can suffer (1978, 
176). This is, of course, the very criteria that Peter Singer pro-
poses for their moral considerability. He bases his anti-specie-
sist ethic on Jeremy Bentham’s famous: “The question is not, 
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Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” 
Singer insists that all suffering, no matter whose, is alike mor-
ally considerable. Species membership per se is irrelevant to 
the question of suffering. Just as Singer bases his animal ethic 
on this continuity between animals and humans (i.e. the equal 
ability to suffer), so too, as we have seen, does Hume empha-
size the continuities between us and the other animals. But, as 
Baier points out, Hume goes much further. Hume’s scope goes 
beyond just pleasures and pains to take a whole gamut of com-
plex emotional and cognitive similarities between the species. 
Turning the usual direction of the comparison from human to 
animal on its head, Baier notes that, “Hume emphasizes the 
continuities, and these continuities go well beyond shared sen-
sitivity to pleasure and pain. Both in our cognitive habits and in 
our emotional range, human nature as Hume sees it is a special 
case of animal nature” (1985, 147). 
Darwin himself could not have said it better. As Antony Pis-
ton argues, “Hume’s recognition of the fundamental similari-
ties and continuities between human and animal nature…rep-
resents a philosophical revolution in which the view of man as 
a unique creation in God’s image is replaced with that of man 
as a natural object differing only in degree from other animals” 
(1993, 301). Or, as Tom Beauchamp puts it, “Like Darwin after 
him, Hume had a powerful way of demythologizing the idea 
that humans have some magical capacity that distances them as 
a species from the rest of creation” (1999, 332).
By emphasizing, even more than the mere sensitivity to 
pleasures and pains, the other cognitive and emotive continu-
ities between humans and animals, including a degree of self-
consciousness, Hume also seems to have anticipated Regan’s 
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subject-of-a-life criterion for his animal ethic. For Regan, one 
is the subject-of-a-life if: 
They have beliefs and desires; perceptions, memory, 
and a sense of the future, including their own future; 
an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and 
pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to 
initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a 
psychophysical identity over time; and an individual 
welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares 
well or ill for them, logically independently of their 
utility for others and logically independent of their be-
ing the object of anyone else’s interests (2004, 243).
All of these characteristics listed by Regan above Hume as-
cribes, either explicitly or implicitly, to at least some other ani-
mals (again there are degrees of difference here just as in the 
human case as well). Where Hume and Regan part company is 
over the question of rights and justice. Hume explicitly denies 
that animals can be included in notions of justice. But, that does 
not mean, as I will argue, that they are entirely excluded from 
the moral community or that we have no other moral duties 
towards them. As Beauchamp observes:
[I]f animals have these properties, then perhaps they 
merit whatever moral protections humans enjoy by 
virtue of having the same or relevantly similar proper-
ties…Hume does not appear to have set out to prove 
in this way that animals merit increased moral protec-
tions, but he opened the door to this conclusion with 
his psychology and moral philosophy. Paradoxically, 
this point may turn out to be Hume’s most enduring 
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legacy in today’s moral controversies about the human 
use of nonhuman animals (1999, 332).
Justice
Justice for Hume is an artificial virtue. It is inextricably con-
nected to property rights. Thus to exclude animals from jus-
tice is simply to point out that animals do not have property 
rights—they cannot be said to own property (Valls 2012, 14). 
For Hume, in a world of superabundance or “extensive be-
nevolence” there would have never arisen any notion or need 
for justice. Likewise, in situations of extreme need the laws of 
justice are suspended (1975, 183-188). Justice assumes a com-
munity of equals. To illustrate this, Hume offers the following 
thought experiment:
Were there a species of creatures intermingled with 
men, which, though rational, were possessed of such 
inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were 
incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the 
highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their 
resentment; the necessary consequence, I think, is that 
we should be bound by the laws of humanity to give 
gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, prop-
erly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with re-
gard to them, nor could they possess any right or prop-
erty, exclusive of such arbitrary lords. Our intercourse 
with them could not be called society, which supposes 
a degree of equality; but absolute command on the one 
side, and servile obedience on the other. Whatever we 
covet, they must instantly resign: Our permission is the 
only tenure, by which they hold their possessions: Our 
compassion and kindness the only check, by which to 
curb our lawless will: And as no inconvenience ever 
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results from the exercise of a power, so firmly estab-
lished in nature, the restraints of justice and property, 
being totally useless, would never have place in so un-
equal a confederacy.
This is plainly the situation of men, with regard to ani-
mals… (1975, 190-191).
It is important to note that right after the passage just quoted 
Hume immediately draws parallels between the European’s 
treatment of “barbarous Indians” and even men’s treatment of 
women (Kuflik 1998). As Andrew Valls interprets this passage, 
for Hume the concept of justice involves a regimen of “gen-
eral and inflexible” rules (property rules) and their application 
for the benefit of society as a whole (Hume 1978, 532). Even 
though particular cases of justice may offend our natural senti-
ments, we agree to abide by the rules of justice in order to gain 
the benefits and security of living in society. As Valls puts it:
The point is that to participate in a regime of rules de-
termining property, one must be able to understand and 
act in accordance with fairly abstract rules. It is this ca-
pacity that Hume thought that nonhuman animals lack 
(Kuflik 1998). And since they lack this capacity they 
are not the sort of creatures who can respect the prop-
erty rights of others, or possess such rights themselves 
(2012, 14).
The crucial thing to note here, however, is that justice is by 
no means the whole, or even the most important part, of moral-
ity for Hume. Just because we do not “lie under the restraint of 
justice” to animals, does not mean we have no moral obliga-
tions to them. “For Hume,” as Midgley notes, “exclusion from 
justice is by no means exclusion from morality” (1983, 48). We 
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are, after all, bound by the “laws of humanity” to give them 
gentle usage. Baier explains:
Animals, Hume says, have no sense of property or 
right, and so there can be no question of any obliga-
tions, based on convention or agreement, either on their 
part or owed to them. Hume would reject any attempt 
to give sense to the concept of rights of animals, since 
all rights arise from artifice. But since the artificial vir-
tues are only a small subset of the virtues, the fact that 
animals have no obligations or rights would not mean 
that no moral wrongs can be done to them, nor even 
that they themselves have no ‘duties’ (1985, 147).
Moreover, as she concludes a few pages later:
The duties of justice will not be owed to them, but all 
the natural virtues will cover our treatment of animals. 
Because we can recognize what constitutes harm to 
them because they, like us, are potential victims of hu-
man vices, we have both sympathetic and self-interest-
ed reasons to condemn humanly inflicted harm to them 
(1985, 149).
 Humanity
Whatever duties we have towards animals clearly arise for 
Hume not on the basis of rights or justice claims, but rather on 
grounds of “humanity.” In this way Hume can help us shift the 
contemporary debate away from “rights” and more towards our 
duties of care and benevolence. As Valls compellingly demon-
strates in his paper, for Hume the laws of humanity are even 
more exalted and compelling than the laws of justice. Human-
ity for Hume is synonymous with benevolence, which is a natu-
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ral virtue (Debes 2007). As Debes defines it, “humanity (as a 
principle of human nature) is more like a disposition towards 
benevolence, at least insofar as we conceptualize benevolence 
as the desire for another’s good” (2007, 29). The sentiment 
of humanity is activated, as Debes copiously demonstrates, 
through sympathy. Although Hume most often talks in terms of 
sympathy and feeling for other humans, there is good reason to 
think that for Hume the sentiment of humanity need not neces-
sarily be so limited. Indeed, Hume at times seems to suggest 
there is no such thing as a love of humanity merely as such. 
Consider what he says in the Treatise:
In general, it may be affirm’d, that there is no such pas-
sion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as 
such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or 
of relation to ourself. ‘Tis true, there is no human, and 
indeed no sensible, creature, whose happiness or mis-
ery does not, in some measure, affect us, when brought 
near to us, and represented in lively colors: But this 
proceeds merely from sympathy, and is no proof of 
such an universal affection to mankind, since this con-
cern extends itself beyond our own species (1978, 481 
emphasis mine).
There is no simple love of “mankind” in the abstract. There 
is sympathy for the happiness or misery of concrete individ-
uals, human or nonhuman, when this happiness or misery is 
made known to us, as it touches us. Hume thus avoids the ab-
stracting sort of universalization that is often criticized in femi-
nist ethics. Hume’s notion of sympathy requires some degree of 
personal connection and relatedness. It is contextual and indi-
vidual. It need not be completely subjective, as we will see, but 
it is not just a theoretical abstraction either. 
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In the second Enquiry, Hume states of the sentiment of hu-
manity:
If we consider the principles of the human make, such 
as they appear to daily experience and observation, we 
must, a priori, conclude it impossible for such a crea-
ture as man to be totally indifferent to the well or ill-be-
ing of his fellow creatures, and not readily, of himself, 
to pronounce, where nothing gives him any particular 
bias, that what promotes their happiness is good, that 
which tends to their misery is evil, without any further 
regard or consideration (1975, 230).
While “fellow creatures” here could appear to simply refer to 
fellow human ones, a few paragraphs later Hume makes it clear 
that the feeling of humanity includes both “mankind” and “our 
fellow creatures.” This passage is crucial because here Hume 
makes his strongest case for the importance that he places on 
the feeling of humanity: “that it is a foundation of the chief part 
of morals, which has reference to mankind and our fellow crea-
tures” (1975, 231 emphasis mine). By stipulating both “man-
kind” and fellow creatures, Hume is explicitly stating here that 
“our fellow creatures”, i.e. the other animals, are indeed part of 
our moral community. They are morally considerable. 
Fellow Creatures
Reading “fellow creatures” as “animals” in the previous 
quotation we see that Hume takes it to be impossible for a sym-
pathetic creature such as ourselves to be totally indifferent to 
their well or ill-being. Indeed such an indifferent person would 
be a sort of “monster” according to Hume. Hume asks us to 
imagine such a “fancied monster”:
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Let us suppose a person originally framed so as to have 
no manner of concern for his fellow-creatures, but to 
regard the happiness and misery of all sensible beings 
with greater indifference than even two contiguous 
shades of the same color (1975, 235).
There can be no doubt that the difference between the person 
with humanity and this moral monster is precisely whether or 
not they care about the happiness and misery of all sentient be-
ings. Thus, there is no reason to suppose that for Hume moral 
concern is limited to just members of our own species. It may 
not be a matter of more narrowly defined justice but rather it 
is one of humanity which is based on much broader sympathy.
That Hume most often refers specifically to humans is un-
derstandable in the sense that he was writing a Treatise on 
Human Nature and the general Principles of (human) Morals 
rather than books on animal ethics. My contention is that there 
was nothing, except perhaps historical circumstance, to pre-
vent him from extending his explicit moral concern to animals 
themselves.
Unequals
The laws of humanity would appear to govern especially in 
cases of inequality in power. As Robert Shaver argues, “hu-
manity is understood as the concern for others that operates be-
tween unequals and especially between parents and children” 
(1992, 553). Just as we would have no Humean duties of justice 
towards children, this certainly would not mean that we would 
have no moral duties towards them. As later feminist care-ori-
ented ethics will have it, we have duties of care for those in 
positions of greater need. So for Hume is there a duty of benev-
olence owed by parents to children (1978, 478, 518) and even 
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by the rich to the poor (1978, 482); all examples of unequals in 
power. Hume likewise argues from the laws of humanity that 
we have duties to animals—our unequals in power. One of the 
dynamics that feminist care ethics has brought to the fore is 
that duties of care apply in situations of inequality. Children or 
the ill and disabled need care precisely because they are not in 
a position to take care of their own needs. Feminist theorists 
have critiqued the notion of autonomous and equal selves that 
are at the foundation of both utilitarian and rights theories for 
ignoring the embedded relations of care that have made and 
continue to make those selves possible. We all needed care in 
infancy, and will likely need care at various times throughout 
our lives and at our lives’ end. Hume’s duties of humanity or 
benevolence take this relational web into account.
Virtue and Vice
Hume is much more like a virtue theorist than a natural 
rights theorist. Benevolence is surely a virtuous character trait 
for him: 
Here is a man, that does many benevolent actions; re-
lieves the distress’d, comforts the afflicted, and extends 
his bounty to the greatest of strangers. No character 
can be more amiable and virtuous. We regard these ac-
tions as proofs of the greatest humanity (1978, 478).
Such a person meets with universal approbation. I would 
suggest that we feel the same natural approbation for those 
who are kind to animals and a natural disapprobation for those 
who are engage in cruelty towards them. While benevolence is 
most admirable and virtuous, cruelty is the “most detested of all 
the vices” (Hume 1978, 605, cf., 296, 470). There can be little 
doubt that many of the common practices in modern indus-
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trial animal farming constitute cruelty: debeaking, dehorning, 
and castration all without anesthetic; confinement in gestation 
crates, veal hutches, and battery cages with little or no room to 
move or even lie down; the deprivation of sunlight and fresh 
air along with the frustration of almost all natural tendencies; 
and the list goes on. These practices would legally constitute 
cruelty if done to our companion animals. It is only because of 
exemptions for farmed animals that they are not legally consid-
ered animal cruelty. Most people seeing undercover video from 
animal groups documenting these practices experience natural 
feelings of shock, disgust, sympathy and overall disapproba-
tion.
Universalizability
It remains here to say a word about the universalizability 
of Hume’s ethic of sympathy and why that might be impor-
tant. Feminist ethics has tried to counterbalance the prevailing 
trends, evident in both utilitarianism and deontology, towards 
mathematical abstraction and atomism with its focus on the 
personal, contextual, and relational. Carol Gilligan’s ground-
breaking work, In a Different Voice, contrasts justice with car-
ing in this regard (see Luke 2007). Regan has criticized the care 
tradition of ethics for failing to provide a sufficiently univer-
salizable ethic that can include those outside of one’s immedi-
ate circle. “What are the resources within the ethic of care that 
can move people to consider the ethics of their dealings with 
individuals who stand outside the existing circle of their valued 
interpersonal relationships?”, he asks, “Unless we supplement 
the ethic of care with some other motivating force—some other 
grounding of our moral judgment—we run the grave risk that 
our ethic will be excessively conservative and will blind us to 
those obligations we have to people [or animals] for whom we 
are indifferent” (quoted in Luke 2007, 133, see also Donovan 
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1994, 184). Donovan counters that one clearly can and often 
does feel sympathy for complete strangers. She and other femi-
nist care theorists, like Virginia Held do not see the personalist 
emphasis of feminist ethics to be necessarily so exclusive as 
to apply only to those one personally knows. But they are at 
the same time particular others rather than mathematical ab-
stractions as in the utilitarian calculus or “all rational beings” 
as deontologists prefer (Donovan 1994, 185). There is the rec-
ognition amongst many care ethicists that without losing the 
personal and contextual element there also needs to be a politi-
cal (more like what I am calling a “justice” element) as well. 
Ecofeminist Deane Curtin, for example, calls for a “politicized 
ethic of care” (Curtin 1991). The oppression of women and 
their relegation to the private, domestic sphere certainly has 
its political elements. And, like the oppression of women, that 
of other historically disenfranchised peoples (including nonhu-
man animals) and even the Earth itself under patriarchal and 
colonizing dominion shares certain features in common and 
there are natural alliances to be forged in the liberatory strug-
gles against these systems of domination and oppression. 
Hume’s ethic of sympathy, I think, provides a way to suf-
ficiently universalize ethical norms without overly abstracting 
and rationalizing. Hume relies on our ability to take a “general 
view” and to take a somewhat objective view of the situation. 
Almost as if he is responding to Regan and other critics of care 
ethics who, like Kant before them, worry that sentiments like 
sympathy are too fickle and not evenly distributed amongst us, 
Hume writes:
But as this sympathy is variable, it may be thought, that 
our sentiments of morals must admit of all the same 
variations. We sympathize more with persons contigu-
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ous to us, than with persons remote from us: With our 
acquaintance, than with strangers: With our country-
men, than with foreigners. But notwithstanding this 
variation of our sympathy, we give the same approba-
tion to the same moral qualities in China as in England. 
They appear equally virtuous, and recommend them-
selves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator 
(1978, 581).
Hume recognizes that it is natural for us to favor those clos-
est and dearest to us. But he also thinks that we can recognize a 
virtue when we see it, across distances and even time (we even 
approve of virtuous deeds and characters from the past). We 
all have our own embodied and embedded perspective on the 
world. I cannot see things through your eyes. We would never 
be able then to even communicate with one another, Hume rea-
sons, unless we could take up some “steady and general points 
of view” (1978, 581-582). Humans, and this is precisely our 
advantage over the other animals and the reason we are moral 
agents, are able to abstract ourselves enough from the situa-
tion to take a more general view. We can form general ethical 
principles based on empirical observation of what most often 
tends towards the good of all concerned. But this is not a simple 
utilitarian calculus. It is based on sympathetic feeling and our 
ability to imaginatively and empathetically take up an other’s 
concrete position. It is the virtue itself and the character it gives 
rise to that we approve of, not simply the consequence in a par-
ticular case. The virtues themselves, especially benevolence, 
produce pleasurable feelings within us. A virtuous character is 
more likely to tend towards the benefit of all over the long haul. 
This was the quality, the general tendency towards the general 
welfare, that Hume approved of in justice. It is this unique abil-
ity to take up a general view while at the same time always 
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remaining a sympathetic, embodied, and embedded self that 
grounds Hume’s ethic.
Conclusion
Hume is far more optimistic about human nature than his 
Calvinistic forbearers and contemporaries. He assumes that we 
can and do care about the happiness or misery of others, includ-
ing animals. Hume further assumes that it is this sympathy and 
the feelings of approbation or disapprobation that it generates 
are what move us to act in ethical ways. Reason alone will nev-
er bring about the more ethical treatment of animals many of us 
seek. But sympathy driven care can. The industry which prof-
its from animal exploitation knows this and does all it can to 
keep the animals suffering hidden from our sympathetic view. 
Once the connection is made, however, as Bob Comis (2014), 
Howard Lyman, Harold Brown, and many others can attest, the 
change begins (Peaceable Kingdom, 2012). 
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